Two Bills; Two Agendas by Richardson, Genevra
26
Journal of Mental Health Law May 2005
Two Bills; Two Agendas
Genevra Richardson1
This short article2 represents, in substance, a memorandum of evidence submitted to the Joint
Scrutiny Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill.3
A. The Relationship between the Draft Mental Health Bill and the Mental
Capacity Bill 
The government has published two Bills concerning similar, but not identical, populations and
dealing with some similar decisions. The Mental Capacity Bill (MC) concerns those, mainly adults,
who lack decision-making capacity, while the Mental Health Bill (MH) covers people, including
children, who have a mental disorder of the required severity.4 Both Bills deal with decisions
relating to care and treatment for mental disorder. So adults: 
 who have a mental disorder of sufficient severity to attract MH powers, 
 who require care and treatment for mental disorder, and 
 who lack decision-making capacity,
could fall under the remit of either Bill.
B. The Present Confused Relationship:
Clause 28, Mental Capacity Bill gives priority to MH powers where these have already been
engaged, but offers no indication of how the initial choice is to be made. MC further provides that
people acting under the Bill (clause 6), including attorneys and court appointed deputies (clauses
11 and 20), may in certain circumstances restrain the incapable person (P). MC therefore envisages
the need to override physical objections on the part of P, suggesting that the Bill’s powers are not
to be limited to those who appear to comply.
Clause 9, Draft Mental Health Bill sets out the conditions for the use of compulsory powers under
that framework. These would cover people with a mental disorder, who require treatment for that
disorder in order to protect them from suicide, serious self-harm or serious self-neglect, or in order
to protect others. There is no requirement that the person must first lack capacity, but many of
those who met these conditions would certainly do so. However, clause 9(5) specifically excludes
from MH powers those who can be lawfully treated without the use of those powers, provided
1 Professor of Public Law, Queen Mary, University of
London. Chair of the Expert Committee appointed by
the Government in September 1998 to advise on mental
health law reform, and whose report ‘Review of the
Mental Health Act 1983’ was published in November
1999. 
2 An earlier version of this text was presented at the
North East Mental Health Law Conference held in
November 2004. This article was accepted for
publication before (a) the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny
Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill reported
(23rd March 2005), and (b) the Mental Capacity Bill
received the Royal Assent (7th April 2005).
3 Oral evidence was given on 20th October 2004 (ref:
HCii); written evidence was printed on 21st January
2005 (ref: DMH 408).
4 Mental Capacity Bill 2004, as introduced in the
Commons 24 November 2004, and Draft Mental
Health Bill, published by the Department of Health,
September 2004, Cm 6305–1. 
Two Bills; Two Agendas
27
they pose no serious threat to others. This suggests that in cases where care and treatment for
mental disorder can be provided under MC powers, those powers should take priority, provided
there is no substantial risk of serious harm to others. This would include a significant number of
those cases where the person lacks capacity. Indeed, on a very literal reading of clause 60 of the
Draft Mental Health Bill a person who entered MH powers while having capacity would have to be
discharged from those powers if he or she subsequently lost that capacity. That clause requires the
clinical supervisor to discharge a patient if at any time he or she is not satisfied that all the relevant
conditions are met. It could thus impose on the clinical supervisor a continuing duty to keep
capacity under review.
Further clause 9 does not cover people who need treatment for mental disorder and who lack
capacity, but who present no threat to others and the danger they pose to themselves is
insufficiently severe to meet the clause 9 threshold of risk of suicide, serious self-harm or serious
self-neglect. Such people would have to be treated under MC, if at all, even if they were non-
compliant. 
There is therefore a considerable area of ambiguity and possible overlap between the two Bills. This
uncertainty matters for patients, carers and mental health professionals and in certain crucial
respects cannot be left to resolution through the Codes of Practice; it will require the amendment
of both Bills.
Implications for patients. The uncertainty matters for patients because the choice of framework
will carry significant implications. In many respects the provisions of MC might be preferable
because all decisions would have to be made in P’s best interests, the principle of least restriction
would apply, a valid advance decision would be respected, a single framework would apply to all
decisions P was unable to make for him or herself and there would be less stigma. However, under
MC P would enjoy less rigorous safeguards than those which would apply under MH (see below).
Implications for carers and health professionals. The uncertainty also matters for carers and for
health professionals who need to know with as much clarity as possible which framework to apply.
It is possible that they too might have a preference for MC powers because those powers would
involve less bureaucracy and would place all decisions under the same framework, an issue of
particular importance in relation to medical care and treatment. To some extent the required
clarity might be achieved through Codes of Practice but some of the issues reach beyond the
proper scope of a Code. 
C. Safeguards and Bournewood5
While it might be possible to accommodate most of the above issues by selective redrafting of
both Bills and the production of carefully co-ordinated Codes of Practice, this would not deal with
the central issue of safeguards. MC provides far less rigorous safeguards to the patient, in relation
to both treatment and the deprivation of liberty, than does MH. It is hard to justify this distinction
in anything other than pragmatic terms and it is now evident that no pragmatic justification for the
absence in MC of adequate safeguards in relation to the deprivation of liberty will suffice. The HL
decision of the ECrtHR6 is quite clear that the common law regime under which individuals who
lack the capacity to consent are currently deprived of their liberty in hospital fails to comply with
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the requirements of either article 5.1 or article 5.4. The detention in hospital under the authority
of the common law is itself unlawful, since there are no formal admission procedures, no clarity
over the purpose of admission and insufficient safeguards to protect against arbitrary detention,
as required by article 5.1. Also there is no access to a court to determine the legality of the
detention under article 5.4. Although this note is primarily concerned with those people who are
deprived of their liberty within hospital, the reasoning of the court in HL could apply equally in
respect of those detained in non-hospital institutions.
While the ECrtHR’s judgement in HL presents immediate practical problems for all those
concerned with the provision of care and treatment for people who lack capacity, particularly when
that care involves the imposition of significant restrictions on the liberty of the incapable person.
This note does not attempt to offer any answers to those immediate problems. Rather it considers
how the two current Bills might be amended to provide possible long-term solutions. 
D. HL and both Bills.
In broad terms the provisions of MH are designed to comply with the requirements of article 5.
The same is not true of MC. Significantly perhaps the explanatory notes accompanying MC make
no mention of article 5 in their section Compatibility with ECHR.7
Article 5.1: MC has been drafted with no appreciation of the implications of the fact that the
people resident in hospital under its provisions might be detained in the terms of the ECHR. As
a consequence no provision has been made for the formal recognition of detention, its recording,
its justification and its review. While the substantive provisions of the Bill are such as to render
detention under its powers potentially lawful under 5.1, there are insufficient procedural
safeguards. And, according to the court in HL, lawfulness under 5.1 requires ‘the existence in
domestic law of adequate legal protections and “fair and proper procedures”’(para115). 
Article 5.4: The breach of article 5.4 is perhaps even more evident. In HL the Court refused to
accept that either proceedings for judicial review or habeas corpus, or the ability to seek
declaratory relief from the High Court could satisfy the requirements of article 5.4. Neither the
developments in judicial review following the Human Rights Act8 nor the present extension of the
role of the Court of Protection under the MC Bill itself would be sufficient to fill the gap. In
theory the role of the Court of Protection could be amended to do so, but it is not the obvious
body for the task since its expertise lies in the assessment of decision-making capacity and in the
determination of the best interests of people lacking capacity, not in reviewing detention, imposing
compulsory treatment or approving care plans. 
Quite clearly steps have to be taken to bring the new provisions into compliance with article 5 and,
against the uncertainties outlined above, those steps must involve redrafting the primary
legislation. There is no single obvious solution but two distinct and, to some extent, polar options
present themselves. Each has both advantages and disadvantages but it is possible that a
combination of their strengths might eventually be achieved. As a first step the two options are
described below.
7 Explanatory Notes accompanying the Bill as
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E. The Extension of the Mental Health Bill.
On the assumption that the admission and discharge procedures in MH will comply with article 5,
one option would be to extend the ambit of MH to cover all those who lack capacity and need
treatment for mental disorder in hospital. This could be done by amending clause 9 to restrict the
scope of clause 9(5), and by extending the conditions to include those with mental disorder who
need medical treatment in hospital in the interests of their own health and/or safety and who lack
the capacity to make the necessary decisions themselves. This would include both compliant and
non-compliant patients and, because of the breadth of the definition of medical treatment (clause
2(7)), could include those who simply require secure accommodation in the interests of their own
safety. Further, in order to remove any residual borderline issues, it might be necessary to restrict
the use of restraint under MC, so that restraint amounting to the deprivation of liberty could only
be used in situations of emergency. 
Advantages: 
 Such an extension of MH would ensure compliance with article 5.
 It would also clarify the relationship between MH and MC. 
Disadvantages: 
 The application of full MH requirements to all patients lacking capacity and requiring
treatment in hospital would have unrealistic resource implications. In part this could be
dealt with by reintroducing provisions similar to those included in Part 5 of the 2002 Draft
Mental Health Bill.9 These could be adjusted to enable them to relate specifically to the
amended clause 9 conditions and to provide sufficient procedural formality within the
process of admission to ensure compliance with article 5.1 
 Patients without capacity who would now move from MC to MH would be at a
disadvantage unless MH was also amended to reflect the provisions in MC in relation to
best interests, the least restrictive principle and advance decisions. 
 The relevance of the MC framework would be greatly reduced for a significant proportion
of those for whom it was specifically designed: those lacking capacity who require medical
treatment for mental disorder (very broadly defined, clause 2(7)) in conditions amounting
to detention under the ECHR.
F. The Introduction of Enhanced Safeguards in the Mental Capacity Bill.
The procedure for admission to detention could be tightened up in MC and access to a tribunal to
review the legality of that detention could be introduced. The MC framework might then become
the preferred option for the provision of treatment and care for mental disorder in hospital in
cases where the individual lacked capacity. 
Advantages: 
 It would achieve compliance with article 5 for all people detained in hospital who lack
capacity, whatever the nature of the treatment they were receiving. 
9 2002 Department of Health, Cm 5538–1
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 It could reduce the need to use MH powers with all their resource and stigma implications. 
 It would enable the provision of treatment for both mental and physical disorder under the
same provisions.
 It would extend the remit of capacity legislation designed in accordance with the principles
of non-discrimination and respect for patient autonomy.
Disadvantages:
 It would be very difficult to achieve at this late stage in the progress of the MC Bill, but it
could be effected through consequential amendments to the MC Act made subsequently in
the MH Bill.
 There may be a concern that the article 5.1 safeguards included in MC would be too
resource intensive if they simply replicated those in MH and included the early automatic
involvement of the tribunal. However, admission procedures could be devised which were
essentially administrative with a right of appeal to a tribunal, and yet were compliant with
article 5.1
 There might be fears that the provision of article 5.4 safeguards in MC would lead to the
creation of a second tribunal. This could be avoided by the creation of a single body to
operate under both MC and MH.
 If MC were to become the primary framework for the provision of treatment in hospital in
cases of incapacity, then attention would need to be paid to the safeguards relating to
treatment provided within that framework: the inclusion of regular reviews of care and
treatment plans, for example, and access to advocacy services.
 An extension in the coverage of MC would not solve all the borderline issues unless a
matching restriction in coverage were to be expressly introduced in MH. Thus MH might
be expressly restricted to, for example, the core population of those who, whether capable
or incapable, present a substantial risk of serious harm to others and possibly those who,
despite being capable, present a similar risk to themselves. 
 There would remain a need to provide for the transfer of an individual from MC to MH if
he or she remained a sufficient risk after regaining capacity.
The preceding paragraphs do not provide a comprehensive answer to the difficulties raised by the
interface between the two Bills, nor to the issues presented by HL. The solution which is eventually
chosen will have to reflect government priorities. However, it is possible to argue from the above
that the weight of advantage lies with an extension of the Mental Capacity Bill and a corresponding
restriction in the scope of the Mental Health Bill.
